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PENUMBRAS, PERIPHERIES, EMANATIONS,
THINGS FUNDAMENTAL AND THINGS
FORGOTIEN: THE GRISWOLD CASE
Paul G. Kauper*
riswold v. Connecticut1 held by a seven-to-two margin that the
Connecticut criminal statute forbidding the use of contraceptive devices by married couples was unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment. This simplified version of the holding, however,
does not adequately portray the great variety of doctrines relied upon
by the Justices constituting the majority. The opinion of the Court,
·written by Mr. Justice Douglas, found the statute invalid because
it invaded a constitutionally protected right of marital privacy found
to emanate from the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights and
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. The
separate opinion by Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan, expressed concurrence in
Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion and then proceeded to an independent
ground-that the right of privacy as invoked and protected in this
case is a fundamental right protected by the due process clause
against state deprivation. The opinion used the ninth amendment
to help bolster the independent fundamental rights theory. The
separate concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, incorporating
views expressed earlier in a dissenting opinion,2 clearly disassociated
itself from the opinion of the Court and rested squarely on the
proposition that the Connecticut statute intruded into the privacy
of married couples, thereby impairing a fundamental right protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice
White, writing a separate concurring opinion, likewise explicitly
rested his case on the due process clause, finding that the Connecticut statute as applied to married couples deprived them of liberty
without due process of law, since it invaded the right to be free from
regulation of the intimacies of the marriage relationship. The dissenting opinions by Justices Black and Stewart rejected the notion
that the "right of privacy" on which the case turned finds support in
the specifics of the Bill of Rights, and further rejected the idea that
the Court 1s free, in the interpretation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, to formulate a conception of fundamental rights having no foundation in the specific guarantees of the
Constitution.

G

• Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 597 (1961).
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This brief introductory statement is sufficient to point up the
fascinating feature of Griswold: it laid bare the basic differences
within the Court respecting its role in the protection of fundamental
rights and respecting the interrelationship of the fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights as a central aspect of this problem. It
is to these aspects of the case that my comments are directed. 8
The varying theories followed in the several opinions in the
Griswold case can be fully understood and appreciated only in the
context of the tortuous but fascinating history of the judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.

I.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO
THE BILL OF RIGHTS

By the end of the nineteenth century the Supreme Court had
committed itself to an interpretation of the due process clause
whereby the clause was enlarged beyond its original connotation of
procedural regularity and converted into a vehicle for protecting
the so-called fundamental rights. 4 In the nventieth century the
Court has used various expressions to describe its understanding of
fundamental rights: they are the rights implicit in those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions"; 5 they are those rights "so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.'' 6 In his classic opinion for the Court in Palko v. Gonnecticut,7 Mr. Justice Cardozo spoke of the rights "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."8 The rights protected as fundamental
include both procedural and substantive rights. As applied in its
earlier stages, the due process clause as the guarantee of procedural
rights centered on the "fair trial" concept.9 The substantive rights
emphasized in the earlier stages of the development of the clause
were liberty of contract and freedom in the enjoyment and use of
property. These eventually suffered a decline in the degree of
3. The editors requested me to give my interpretation and comments respecting
the Griswold decision. No attempt is made here to deal at length with the issues and
questions to which the comments are directed or to call the reader's attention to the
voluminous literature on these matters. The documentation is on the whole limited to
the necessary case citations.
4. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
5. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
6. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
7. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
8. Id. at 325. For a collection of phrases used by the Court in formulating the fundamental rights theory, see Mr. Justice :Black's dissenting opinion in Griswold, 381 U.S.
at 511-12 n.4.
9. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937): Hurtado v. California, II0
U.S. 516 (1884).
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judicial protection received, but in their place the Court later stressed
the freedoms specifically set forth in the first amendment-the freedoms of religion, speech, press and assembly.10
A notable and controversial aspect of this development was the
Court's recognition that the fundamental rights protected under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment had no necessary
relationship to the specifics set forth in the first eight amendments
as restrictions on the federal government. In other words, the Court
rejected the idea that the effect of the fourteenth amendment was to
make the first eight amendments apply to the states. In his opinion
in Palko, Mr. Justice Cardozo said that the due process clause absorbed the specifics of the Bill of Rights only insofar as they were
"of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." 11 Indeed, the
whole process whereby the freedoms of the first amendment were
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment as fundamental rights
was a clear-cut application of substantive due process concepts. The
end result has been that the Court has, on the one hand, rejected
certain specifics catalogued in the first eight amendments as nonfundamental and has, on the other hand, recognized as fundamental
certain liberties not specified in these amendments.
To state these developments in what may be called the "main
line" in the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment is not to
suggest that they have gone unchallenged. The elder Mr. Justice
Harlan dissented from the proposition that the rights protected under
the first eight amendments were not included in the rights protected
under the due process clause.12 Mr. Justice Holmes spearheaded a
group of dissenters who remonstrated against the use of the due
process clause to invalidate state legislation found to be an interference with liberty of contract.13 Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr.
Justice Douglas, forcibly stated in his dissenting opinion in Adamson
v. California14 his objections to the fundamental rights interpretation, which he equated with natural law thinking. In his view the
effect of the fourteenth amendment was to make the Bill of Rights
apply to the states, but the Court could not use the due process clause
as a vehicle for protecting any other rights on the theory that they
were fundamental. Justices Murphy and Rutledge, in their dissents
in Adamson, had agreed that the specifics of the Bill of Rights ap10. For references to the cases and a review of this development, see KAuPER,
18-54 (1956).
11. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
12. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (dissenting opinion); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (dissenting opinion).
13. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (dissenting opinion).
14. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).

FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY

1
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plied to the states but did not agree that those specifics were the only
rights protected under the fourteenth amendment.
The course of the decisions in recent years has tended to obscure
the application of the fundamental rights theory. The judicial pro•
tection of economic and proprietary liberties-the liberties em•
phasized in the early substantive rights interpretation of the due
process clause-has declined. The Court has said that these liberties
are subject to restriction in the reasonable exercise of the states'
power to regulate economic matters, and has made it clear that in
this area judicial review of the reasonableness of legislation operates
at a minimal level.15 Indeed, Justices Black and Douglas, in ·writing
for the Court in some of the cases, have stated that the Court is not
free to inquire at all into the reasonableness of restrictions on economic liberty, since that is an intrusion into the legislative domain
in areas where the Constitution imposes no specific restriction.10 On
the other hand, the Court has come to recognize that all of the first
.amendment freedoms are fundamental and therefore protected
against the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.17 Likewise, the Court has found in more recent decisions that some of the procedural safeguards embodied in the
specifics of the Bill of Rights are fundamental and must therefore
be respected by the states. The right to counsel,18 the freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure,19 the privilege against self-incrimina15. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
16. See Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court in Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel.
Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), and Mr. Justice .Black's opinions
for the Court in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335
U.S. 525 (1949), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). Mr. Justice Harlan con•
curred in a separate opinion in Skrupa, on the ground that the statute there involved
bore "a rational relation to a constitutionally permissible objective." Id. at 733.
In his opinion in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
supra, Mr. Justice Black said that, beginning with the Nebbia case, the Court had
steadily rejected the due process philosophy enunciated in the Adair-Coppage line of
cases, and in so doing had consciously returned closer and closer "to the earlier con•
stitutional principle that states have power to legislate against what are found to be
injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their
laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some
valid federal law." 335 U.S. at 536.
17. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (freedom of religion); De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931) (freedom of press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speeclt).
The freedom from expropriation of property without compensation, guaranteed
by the fifth amendment, is also recognized as a fundamental right protected under
the fourteenth amendment. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Chi•
cago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Likewise the prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment, found in the eighth amendment, has been made effective
against the states under the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962).
18. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U~. 335 (1963).
19. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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tion, 20 and the right of con£rontation21 have been extended to the
states by virtue of the due process clause. Moreover, the Court has
now made it clear that when a right specifically embodied in the
Bill of Rights is recognized as fundamental, it has the same full scope
and meaning as a restriction on state action as it does in its primary
context within the Bill of Rights as a restriction on the federal government.22 It is in this sense that the first amendment and the provisions of the Bill of Rights specifying the procedural guarantees
mentioned above are said to be incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment.
Notwithstanding the emphasis in recent years on the protection
under the fourteenth amendment of certain specifics of the Bill of
Rights, the Court has continued to afford protection in the name of
due process against governmental restrictions found to constitute
unwarranted or unreasonable interference with rights or liberties
not included in the specifics of the first eight amendments. Thus,
it has invalidated under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment a state statute subjecting. public employees to arbitrary
dismissal23 and a state regulation arbitrarily restricting admission
to the bar.24 The Court relied on the due process clause of the fifth
amendment to invalidate racial segregation in the schools of the
District of Columbia.25 Similarly, in holding invalid the federal
restriction on the issuance of passports to Communists, the Court
found that the statute was an unduly broad restriction on the right
to .travel, which was declared to be a fundamental liberty protected
under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.26 In addition,
the Court has never overruled cases of earlier vintage such as Meyer
20. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
21. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
22. See Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964), and Mr. Justice Goldberg's separate opinion in Pointer v. Texas, supra note 21.
Mr. Justice Harlan has dissented from this view, taking the position that state criminal
procedures are invalid under the due process clause only if they are fundamentally
unfair. See his dissenting opinion in Malloy v. Hogan, supra, and the concurring
opinions by Justices Harlan and Stewart in the Pointer case, supra. Mr. Justice Harlan
likewise makes a distinction between the fundamental freedoms of expression protected
against state action under the due process clause and the freedoms stated in the first
amendment as a restriction on Congress. See his separate opinion in Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). To the same effect, see Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting
opinion in Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
23. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
24. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
25. "Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a
burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the
Due Process Clause." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,500 (1954).
26. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). See also Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958).
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v. Nebraska, 27 invalidating a Nebraska statute forbidding the use of
foreign languages in teaching public school classes, and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 28 invalidating an Oregon statute requiring parents
to send their children to public schools. The Nebraska statute was
found to be an arbitrary interference with "the calling of modem
language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their
own";29 the Oregon statute was found to be an arbitrary interference with the liberty of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children. These cases were clearly grounded on the
fundamental rights interpretation of the due process clause, and
there has been no suggestion in later cases that they have been
repudiated.30
The decisions in the main line of interpretation of the fourteenth amendment support the following conclusions: (1) The Court
has not accepted the thesis that the effect of the fourteenth amendment is to make all of the first eight amendments applicable to the
states. (2) The Court has adhered to the idea that the due process
clause protects only those rights that are fundamental, and that
specifics of the Bill of Rights are absorbed into the fourteenth
amendment only because they are regarded as fundamental. (3) The
Court has continued to recognize that the fundamental rights protected under the due process clauses of both the fifth and fourteenth
amendments may include rights not included in the specifics of the
Bill of Rights.
II.

ANALYSIS OF THE

Griswold

OPINIONS

A. Introduction: The Poe v. Ullman Dissents
The_ opinions in Griswold must be examined against the background of this historical development to see what contribution they
have made in this troubled area of constitutional interpretation.
27. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
28. 268 U.S. !HO (1925).
29. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 394 (1923).
30. For other earlier cases, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), upholding a compulsory vaccination law, and Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), upholding a
statute authorizing compulsory sterilization of mental defectives in state institutions.
Both cases rested on the assumption that the due process clause afforded protection
against arbitrary or unreasonable invasion of bodily integrity. Sec also Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), holding invalid under the equal protection clause a
statute requiring sterilization of certain classes of habitual' criminals. Mr. Justice
Douglas, who wrote the majority opinion, said that the statute involved one of "the
basic civil rights of man." Id. at 541,
For other cases resting on the use _of the due process clause to protect against unreasonable restriction on personal liberties, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at
504 n. • (separate opinion of White, J.)
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First, however, attention should be called 'to the dissenting opinions
of Justices Douglas and Harlan in the earlier case of Poe v. Ullman, 31
in which the Court reµised to pass on the constitutionality of the
Connecticut birth control law on the ground that such a decision
would be premature, since there was no showing that the statute
was actually being enforced. In their separate opinions these two
Justices, after concluding that the elements of a justiciable case or
controversy were present, found the Connecticut ban on the use of
contraceptives unconstitutional because of its invasion of the right
of privacy of married couples.
In his Poe dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas said that although he
believed that "due process" as used in the fourteenth amendment
included all the prptections of the first eight amendments, he did not
think it was confined to them. 32 He cited several cases to support his
view that the liberty protected by the due process clause includes
liberties in addition to those stated in the first eight amendments.33
Indeed, he suggested that the due process clause could be used as a
basis for inquiry concerning the constitutionality of social legislation
dealing with business and economic matters, and that while the
legislative judgment on these matters is nearly conclusive, it is not
beyond judicial inquiry.34 Apparently Mr. Justice Douglas was ready
to use the "liberty" phrase of the due process clause as a source of
judicially protected rights and interests, apart from the specifics of
the Bill of Rights. He said that "liberty" was a conception that
sometimes gained content from either the emanations of the specific
guarantees "or from experience with the requirements of a free
society."35 He characterized the right of privacy as emanating "from
the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live." 86
This language obviously bears a close relationship to such language
as "fundamental principles of liberty and justice," "ordered liberty,"
and the other phrases used in the ·past to define the fundamental
rights protected under the due process clause.
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Poe, found the Connecticut
statute invalid because it was an unwarranted invasion by the state
of the privacy of the marital relationship, which he asserted was
protected as a fundamental liberty secured by the fourteenth amendment. His opinion is notable for its review and reasoned defense of
31. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
32. Id. at 516.
33. E.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (right to travel); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (right to marry, establish a home, and bring up children).
34. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,518 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
35. Id. at 517.
36. Id. at 521.
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the fundamental rights theory. This dissenting opinion impresses me
as not only the ablest and most persuasive opinion that has been
written on this subject, but also, because of its careful analysis of the
right of marital privacy, the best opinion that has been ·written on the
constitutionality of the Connecticut statute. Mr. Justice Harlan
made it clear that he did not rest his decision on the ground that the
statute's general policy against the use of contraceptives was an irrational exercise of the police power; his objection was to the method
by which the state attempted to enforce this policy insofar as it
reached into the privacy of the marital home. Because he regarded
this as a particularly sensitive area, he felt that the Court was under
a special duty to protect this relationship against arbitrary invasion.

B. The Opinion of the Court: Mr. Justice Douglas
We tum now to the Griswold opinions. Mr. Justice Douglas'
unusually short opinion of the Court combined a curious, puzzling
mixture of reasoning with extraordinary freedom in the interpretation of earlier cases. His whole opinion was directed to the end of
demonstrating that the right of marital privacy is protected under
the Bill of Rights and then carried over as a restriction on the states
via the fourteenth amendment. At the outset he seemingly rejected
the possibility of invalidating the Connecticut statute on the ground
that its policy against the use of contraceptives constituted an unreasonable exercise of the police power and hence a deprivation of
liberty without due process of law.37 Rather, it was the direct operation of the law on the intimate relation of husband and wife, and
on their physician's role in one aspect of that relation, which raised
the crucial issue. He stated that the Constitution has protected certain rights which are derived from the Bill of Rights, although not
expressly named there. He spoke of rights "peripheral" to the specifics
named in the first eight amendments and argued that without these
peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure. Thus, he
s_aid, the Court has interpreted the first amendment as including
such peripheral rights as the right of association. 88 On the basis of
this peripheral rights reasoning-and at this point the reader experiences a sense of confusion-he interpreted the Meyer and Pierce
cases to mean that the first amendment forbids a state to "contract
the spectrum of available knowledge"; 89 he then concluded that part
37. "Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York •.• should be
our guide. But we decline that invitation •••• We do not sit as a super-legislature to
determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems,
business affairs, or social conditions." 381 U.S. at 482.
38. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377
U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
39. 381 U.S. at 481-82.
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of the opinion by saying, "and so we reaffirm the principle of the
Pierce and Meyer cases."40
But then Mr. Justice Douglas went on to restate the peripheral
rights theory. He interpreted the cases previously cited in support
of the notion of peripheral rights to mean that the specific guarantees have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees,
that help give them life and substance. At that point he went to the
heart of his argument, saying that "zones of privacy" are created oy
various guarantees: the first amendment, which in its penumbra
includes the privacy linked with the freedom of association; the
third amendment, which prohibits the quartering of soldiers in any
house in time of peace without the consent of the owner; the fourth
amendment, which protects against unreasonable search and seizure;
and the fifth amendment, which protects against self-incrimination.
He also threw in for good measure the ninth amendment, although
its relevancy to his argument in showing a zone of privacy is not
apparent. He quoted the language of Boyd v. United States41 that
the fourth and fifth amendments protect against all governmental
invasions of "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life," 42
and the statement in Mapp v. 0 hio 43 that the fourth amendment
creates "a right to privacy, no less important than any other right
carefully and particularly reserved to the people."44 He said that
the Court has had many controversies over the penumbra! rights of
"privacy and repose," and construed those cases45 to bear witness
that the right of privacy pressing for recognition in Griswold was
a legitimate one.
Griswold, he continued, "concerns a relationship lying within
the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of
contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale,
seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship." 46 Such a law could not stand,
because " 'a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms.' " 47
40. Id. at 483.
41. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
42. Id. at 630.
43. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
44. Id. at 656.
45. E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959);
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
46. 381 U.S. at 485.
47. Id. at 485 (quoting from NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1958)).
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The opinion concluded with the following paragraph:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights
-older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage ... is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. 48
Taken as a whole, Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion is ambiguous
and uncertain in its use of the specifics of the Bill of Rights to in•
validate the Connecticut statute. Is the right of privacy included
within the penumbra of the marriage association and is this association in turn identifiable, as suggested by the last paragraph of the
opinion, with a general right of association peripheral to the first
amendment freedoms? Or is the intimacy of the marriage relation•
ship included within a general zone of privacy of home and family
derived both from the specifically protected zones of privacy and
the penumbra of privacy emanating from specific rights? Or is it the
theory of the case that the Connecticut statute violated the fundamental rights associated with family and the home, not because the
statute rested on a policy which unreasonably interfered with these
rights but because it employed means which violated a right of
privacy derived from the specifics of the Bill of Rights? Whatever
the interpretation, it is clear that Mr. Justice Douglas worked hard
in his opinion to demonstrate that the decision does not rest independently on an interpretation of the due process clause, but is
based on implications from those of the :first eight amendments
which are made applicable to the states by means of the fourteenth
amendment.
C. Concurring Opinions

I. Mr. Justice Goldberg
Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
Mr. Justice Brennan, wrote a separate opinion. Although he said
at the outset that he concurred both in the judgment and the opinion
of the Court, Mr. Justice Goldberg devoted the major part of his
opinion to the elaboration of a separate theory having no necessary
relation to the notion that the right of privacy at issue is an emanation from specifics of the Bill of Rights or embraced within the
penumbra of these rights. While Mr. Justice Goldberg does not
accept the view that due process as used in the fourteenth amendment includes all of the first eight amendments, he does agree that
48. Id. at 486.
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the concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights.
The major portion of his opinion was devoted to an elaboration of
the fundamental rights theory. He repeated with apparent approval
the Court's statement in Snyder v. Massachusetts 49 that the due
process clause protects rights that are "so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 50 To
support the proposition that the liberty protected under the due
process clause includes the right to marry, establish a home, and
bring up children, he referred to the Meyer case and to oth~r cases
in which the Court has used the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to protect fundamental personal liberties.
This part of his opinion is basically a restatement of the classic
fundamental rights theory. What is really novel, however, about
Mr. Justice Goldberg's opini?n is that he further supports the
Court's role in protecting fundamental rights other than those stated
in the Constitution by falling back on the ninth amendment. 51 For
him the ninth amendment shows the intent of the Constitution's
authors that fundamental personal rights should not be denied protection• simply because they are not specifically listed in the first eight
amendments.
•
Mr. Justice Goldberg went on to say that the right of privacy is
a fundamental personal right emanating "from the totality· of the
constitutional scheme under which we live," 52 and that the Connecticut statute dealt with a particularly important and sensitive
area of privacy-that of the home and the marital relation. Connecticut had not shown that the law served any "subordinating interest
which is compelling" 53 or that it was "necessary and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state
policy." 54 At most, the state argued that there was some rational
relation between this statute and what was ·admittedly a legitimate
subject of state concern-the discouragement of extramarital relations. While questioning the rationality of this justification, Mr. ·
Justice Goldberg said that "in any event it [was] clear that the state
49. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
50. 381 U.S. at 487 (quoting from Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
See also id. at 493, where in stating the fundamental rights theory he draws upon the
language in Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in the Poe case, quoted in text
accompanying note 35 supra.
_
51. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
52, 381_ U.S. at 494 (quoting from Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (dissenting
opinion of Douglas, J.)).
53. Id. at 497 (quoting from Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).
54. Ibid. (quoting from McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)).
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interest in safeguarding marital fidelity could be served by a more
discriminately tailored statute, which [did] not . . . sweep unnecessarily broadly, reaching far beyond the evil sought to be dealt with
and intruding upon the privacy of all married couples." 55

2. Mr. Justice Harlan
Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion very clearly disassociated
itself from the Douglas opinion, which Harlan reads as adopting the
view that the fourteenth amendment protects only the rights guaranteed by the letter or the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. Just as
Mr. Justice Harlan rejects the notion that the effect of the fourteenth
amendment is to make the specifics of the Bill of Rights apply to
the states, so he also rejects the idea that the fourteenth amendment
cannot be used to protect rights that are not stated in the Bill of
Rights. He rests his concurrence on the views he stated at length in
his dissenting opinion in the Poe case, where he found the Connecticut statute invalid as an intrusion upon the intimacies of the
marital relation that come within the protection accorded to the
home.
3. Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice White in his separate concurring opinion also clearly
disassociated himself from the notion implicit in the majority opinion that only those rights embraced within the letter or the penumbra of the Bill of Rights are protected under the fourteenth amendment. He fell back upon the general theory that the fourteenth
amendment protects against arbitrary or capricious denial of liberty
and that the liberty thus protected includes the right "to marry,
establish a home and bring up children" 56 and "the liberty ... to
direct the upbringing and education of children," 57 and that these
are among the "basic civil rights of man." 58 He also spoke of the
right "to be free of regulation of the intimacies of the marriage relationship."59 Thus, any statute forbidding the use of birth control
devices by married persons, prohibiting doctors from giving advice
to married persons on proper and effective methods of birth control,
and having the clear effect of denying to disadvantaged citizens of
the state access to medical assistance and up-to-date information with
respect to methods of birth control, bears a substantial burden of
justification when attacked under the fourteenth amendment. Con55. Id. at 497-98.
56. Id. at 502 (quoting from Meyer v. Nebraska, 262, 390, 399 (1923)).
57. Ibid. (quoting from Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)).
58. Ibid. (quoting from Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
59. Id. at 503.
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ceding that the state's policy against all forms of promiscuous or
illicit sexual relationships is a permissible legislative goal, Mr. Justice
White then proceeded to demonstrate that this particular restriction
on the use of contraceptive devices by married couples could not be
justified by reference to that legitimate public policy. The distinctive feature of Mr. Justice White's opinion, apart from the fact that
it is a clear articulation of the substantive rights interpretation of
due process, is the care with which he examines the Connecticut
law in determining whether any rational consideration appropriate
to matters of public concern justifies the restriction.
D. Dissenting Opinions

I. Mr. Justice Black
For those acquainted with Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion
in the Adamson case, his dissent in Griswold comes as no surprise,
since in his Adamson dissent he had already taken the position that
the fourteenth amendment makes the Bill of Rights applicable to
the states and that there is no basis for a judicial formulation of
fundamental rights other than those embraced by the specifics of
the first eight amendments. His dissent in large part reaffirms the
basic idea set forth in his Adamson opinion-that it is th~ business
of the Court to protect the specific rights guaranteed in the Constitution but not to pass judgment on the reasonableness of state
legislative enactments alleged to impair other fundamental rights
that have their source in a natural-law type of thinking. He therefore basically disagrees with the theory expressed by Justices Harlan
and White in their concurring opinions. Likewise, he cannot accept
the view stated by Mr. Justice Goldberg that the ninth amendment
is a basis for judicial assertion of new fundamental rights, since, as
he sees it, this is simply another way of stating the discredited natural
rights philosophy. Moreover, he rejects the theory stated in Mr.
Justice Douglas' opinion that the right of privacy involved in Griswold is embraced within the penumbra of rights specified in the
Bill of Rights; he feels that it is much too broad a generalization
to say that the specifics of the Bill of Rights create a general right of
privacy of the kind relied upon by the Court.

2. Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice Stewart dissented on essentially the same grounds. 60
He agreed with Mr. Justice Black that the t).Se of the ninth amend60. Mr. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Griswold is the first clear-cut statement by him rejecting the formulation in the name of the due process- clause of a
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ment added nothing to the case so far as the Court's power to protect
rights not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights is concerned,
since the purpose of both the ninth and tenth amendments was to
make clear that the federal government was to be a government of
express, limited powers and that all rights and powers not delegated
to it were retained by the people. Indeed, in his view, to say that
the ninth amendment, intended as a restriction on the federal government, has anything to do with this case, involving the validity
of a state statute, "is to turn somersaults with history." 61

III. THE

CONTRIBUTION OF

Griswold

TO GENERAL

CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

In appraising the significance of Griswold we must distinguish
between the immediate impact pf the case and its larger significance
in terms of general constitutional theory. Griswold holds no more
than that a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married
couples is inyalid as an invasion of a right of marital privacy protected against the states under the fourteenth amendment. The
case does not mean that a state may not prohibit the manufacture
and sale of contraceptives; still less does it suggest any questioning
of the validity of laws dealing with illicit sexual relations. Two
important types of right are stressed: the rights associated with marriage, family, and the home, and a right of privacy incident to constitutionally protected activities and relations. Family and marital
rights have assumed a new constitutional significance, and fresh
vitality has been given to the Meyer and Pierce decisions. Furthermore, recognition of the right of privacy may well be an opening
wedge for extension of that right in new directions.
The larger significance of the case, however, is the contribution,
if any, that it makes to general constitutional theory respecting
fundamental rights, the relationship of these rights to the specifics
of the Bill of Rights, and the standard to be employed by the Court
in passing on the constitutionality of legislation allegedly impinging
on fundamental rights.

A. Application of the Bill of Rights Guarantees to the States
Griswold does not bear directly on the question whether the
effect of. the fourteenth amendment is to make all the specifics of
theory of fundamental substantive rights not identifiable with the specifics of the first
eight amendments. Compare his position, as expressed in his concurring opinion in
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), that the due process clause assures a fundamental
right to procedural fairness, and his reference; in his opinion in Griswold, 381 U.S. at
528, to the use of the due process clause -for that purpose.
61. 381 11.S. at 529.

December 1965]

Penumbras and Peripheries

249

the Bill of Rights apply to the states, but it seems clear that Justices
Black and Douglas have gained no new converts to their position on
this issue. Indeed, Mr. Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion
joined _by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan, expressly said that he has not accepted that view, although he does
agree that the fourteenth amendment does make applicable to
the states the specifics which are fundamental. Mr. Justice Harlan
has always made it abundantly clear that he totally rejects the incorporation theory in all of its aspects. Justices Clark, Stewart, and
White have never identified themselves with the Black-Douglas
thesis, and nothing in the separate opinions by Justices White and
Stewart in Griswold would suggest an acceptance of that thesis. At
most, then, it may be said that a majority of the Justices are ready
to find that specifics of the Bill of Rights apply to the states only
when those specifics are identified as fundamental rights. It is worth
emphasizing that a majority could not have been mustered in Griswold to hold the statute invalid except for the concurrence of those
Justices who found the statute invalid as an invasion of a right which
they characterized as "fundamental."

B. Fourteenth Amendment Protection of Rights Not
Specified in the Bill of Rights
The most immediate impact of the Griswold decision is on the
concomitant question whether rights not specified in the Bill of
Rights are protected under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The decision is ambiguous in this respect. According
to one view expressed in the case and supported by five of the
Justices,62 the right of privacy on which the case hangs is embraced
within the penumbra or periphery of specifics guaranteed in the first
eight amendments. On the other hand, it is also clear that the idea
that the right of privacy is a fundamental right quite apart from the
specifics of the Bill of Rights also receives the support of a majority
of the Justices. Certainly Justices Harlan and White support this
view, and I interpret Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion to the same
effect, although the fundamental rights thinking in his opinion is
bolstered by an appeal to the ninth amendment. Griswold can thus
be interpreted as a reaffirmation by a majority of the Court of the
62. This is the view expressed in the opinion of the Court written by Mr. Justice
Douglas. Mr. Justice Clark concurred in this sub silentio, since he did not write a
separate opinion. Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Warren and Brennan, concurred in the Douglas opinion, although he also found an independent basis for the
result in the. fundamental rights theory.
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fundamental rights theory-both in the sense that only fundamental
rights derived from the Bill of Rights are incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment and in the sense that the due process clause
is a source of rights apart from the specifics of the Bill of Rights.
C. The Standard To Be Employed in Evaluating State Legislation

One of the more important aspects of the case is the strict stand•
ard employed by the Court in determining whether the Connecticut
statute forbidding the use of contraceptives was constitutional as
applied to married couples. It was not enough for the state to point
to what it regarded as some rational considerations to support the
restriction on married couples as a means of enforcing a general
policy directed against promiscuous or extramarital sexual relations.
The opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas applied the familiar idea of the
overbroad statute: a legitimate governmental policy cannot be
achieved by means which are so unnecessarily broad that they invade
areas of protected freedom. Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion stressed
the idea that when a statute impairs fundamental personal liberties,
the state must show that it is justified by a compelling public interest,
and the law must be carefully tailored so as not to reach beyond the
evil sought to be dealt with by intruding upon an important constitutional interest. In his dissent in Poe, Mr. Justice Harlan said that
when a statute abridges fundamental liberties, a closer scrutiny is
required than that indicated by the rationality test; he found nothing
that even remotely justified the obnoxiously intrusive means employed by Connecticut to effectuate a policy expressing the state's
concern for its citizens' moral welfare. He pointed to the "utter
novelty" of the Connecticut statute's ban on the use of contraceptives
by married couples. 63 Mr. Justice White, in his concurring opinion
in Griswold, stressed the point that a state cannot enter the realm of
family life "without substantial justification,"64 and devoted a major
part of his opinion to showing that no substantial justification was
put forth to justify the sweeping scope of the statute and its telling
effect on the freedom of married persons.
It is thus evident that the several members of the Court feel that
an exacting judicial scrutiny, like that employed in cases involving
first amendment freedoms, is required when legislation impinges
upon the realm of the family life and marital relationship.
63. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961),
64. 381 U.S. at 502.
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SOME COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS

A. No Major Change in Constitutional Theory
Insofar as the result in Griswold rests on the fundamental rights
interpretation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and as I interpret the opinions five Justices can be counted in
support of this theory, the case states no new theory and is consistent
with the main line of development under the substantive rights interpretation of the liberty protected by the due process clause. It
also supports the statement made earlier that the Court has never
repudiated the fundamental rights theory. Furthermore, the result,
is not at all inconsistent with the cases that have reduced economic
liberty to a minimum of judicial protection, whether by denying that
liberty of contract is a constitutionally protected right or by holding
that it is subject to legislation that meets the test of rationality. The
freedom of a legislature to determine economic policy in the public
interest stands on a quite different level from its freedom to determine social policy by means that intrude upon personal liberty and
essentially private conduct. It is fair to suppose that, notwithstanding statements to the contrary in some opinions, the Court will
continue to recognize some basis for judicial protection of economic
and proprietary liberties. The essential point is that restrictions on
economic liberty are subject to a less exacting judicial scrutiny, with
greater deference being shown to the legislative judgment. Here the
simple rationality test applies, 65 but when legislation impinges upon
fundamental non-economic liberties of an essentially personal character, as in Griswold, a more exacting judicial test is applied. There is
nothing new about the idea that the Court sees a hierarchy of values
protected under the Constitution and that the degree of judicial
scrutiny and protection varies in direct proportion to the importance
of the right. The frequently voiced notion that first amendment
freedoms are "preferred" is an expression of this idea.66 Similarly, in
the interpretation of the equal protection clause the Court has made
it clear that it is ready to depart from the rationality test in examining the constitutionality of legislative classification when the classification either rests on a factor that the Court regards as impermissible
in view of our whole constitutional tradition or serves the purpose
of impairing important personal interests.67
65. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503 (1965) (concurring opinion of
White, J.); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 518 (1961) (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.).
66. See McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1182 (1959).
67. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1965) (White, J.), rejecting the rationality test when legislation is based on a racial classification; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
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B. Criticism of Mr. Justice Douglas' Opinion
The opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas appears to me to be a
labored attempt to identify the right of marital privacy with the
specifics of the Bill of Rights. It says, when we penetrate the special
vocabulary (peripheral rights, penumbras formed by emanations
from specific rights, zones of privacy), that the right of marital
privacy is implied from an aggregate of specifics. I have no difficulty
with such a theory of implied rights. For example, the right to
associate for the purpose of expressing views on political, economic,
and social matters seems fairly to be implied from the first amendment. It is another thing, however, to suggest that because marriage
is a form of association it comes within the protection afforded freedom of association. The Bill of Rights does in various specifics recognize zones of privacy in protecting persons, their homes, and even
their political views from intrusion by government. Again, however,
it is quite another thing to say that a general right of marital privacy
can be distilled from these specifics. 68 It is not stretching things to
say that the sanctity of the home protected against unreasonable
searches and seizures implies a privacy of family life, as Mr. Justice
Harlan pointed out in his illuminating dissent in Poe. But it protects this privacy against unreasonable intrusions by public officers;
it is another thing to hold unconstitutional a law which has the
effect of intruding into this privacy by subjecting marital intimacies
to criminal sanctions and which could therefore be authority for a
search and seizure to determine whether the statute is being violated.
Insofar as the Court assumes to invalidate legislation by converting
a freedom from unreasonable police searches into a fundamental
substantive right restricting legislative action in formulating social
policy, it is engaging in that expansive use of the judicial power to
formulate conceptions of fundamental rights as a limitation on legislative invasion which has characterized the judicial role under the
due process clause.
The point of the foregoing discussion is that a theory of rights
implied from the specifics of the Bill of Rights can be pushed to
the point where the distinction between such "implied" rights and
the formulation of "fundamental" rights in the interpretation of the
due process clause is wholly verbal and without substance. The
question that may be raised about all this is whether the Court,
U.S. 535 (1942), holding invalid a classification used in a statute requiring the sterilization of habitual criminals; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), holding invalid a
state legislative apportionment system because of its discriminatory impact on the right
to vote.
68. 381 U.S. 479, 508-09 (dissenting opinion of Black, J.),
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through the peripheral-emanations-penumbra process of interpretation, is really finding a more objective and more secure basis for the
new right it has recognized than is found in the fundamental rights
interpretation of the due process clause. Indeed, in order to command the support of a majority of the Court, it is still essential to
find that the right embraced within penumbras of the specifics of the
Bill of Rights is a fundamental right; judicial subjectivity thus still
plays a crucial part in the final decision.
The accordion-like qualities of the emanations-and-penumbra
theory, and the ease with which it can· be used in the same broad
way in which the fundamental rights theory has been used, become
evident when one considers its application to areas where the Court
in recent years has limited the sphere of constitutional protection.
The point is made that since liberty of contract is not mentioned
in the Constitution, it should not be a constitutionally protected
right. Yet, since the body of the Constitution protects against the
impairment of the obligations of contracts, it does not require a farfetched application of the emanations-and-penumbra theory to suggest that implicit in the contracts clause (or at least radiating from it)
is a constitutional right to enter into contracts. Likewise, it may be
suggested that since the fifth amendment protects property against
expropriation ·without compensation, ~here is surely a penumbra of
rights emanating from this which would include the right to acquire
and enjoy the use of property without arbitrary interference by the
government. I am not suggesting that the Court will arrive at these
results through the application of the peripheral-emanations-penumbra idea. The only point I wish to make is that in extending the
specifics to the periphery, and in finding rights derived from the total
scheme of the Bill of Rights, the Court is applying essentially the
same process as that used in the fundamental rights approach, but
dignifying it with a different name and thereby creating the illusion
of greater objectivity.
As was made clear in the concurring opinions, the past decisions
of the Court, notably the Meyer and Pierce cases, offered an imn;tediate opening for finding that marital privacy, as a facet of the freedom
of family life, was a fundamental right. Yet Mr. Justice Douglas,
steadfastly adhering to the objective of finding the protected right
embraced within the specifics of the first eight amendments, rejected
this opening. While declaring that the Court reaffirmed the principles of these two cases, he interpreted them as showing that the first
and fourteenth amendments forbid a state to contract the spectrum of
learning-an interpretation that would have been astonishing to
Mr. Justice McReynolds, who wrote the opinion in these cases,
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which rested squarely on the fundamental rights interpretation of
the due process clause.
It appears also that Mr. Justice Douglas, in his Griswold opinion,
retreated from his dissenting opinion in Poe, where he indicated that
the Court should invalidate, in the name of the due process clause,
legislation that impinged on an interest "implicit in a free society."
His reason for abandoning this idea in Griswold is perhaps to be
found in the responsibility he faced for writing an opinion for the
Court that would avoid the inevitable division flowing from a
straightforward substantive rights interpretation of the due process
clause. But his effort, if it can be explained on this basis, was not a
richly rewarding one in view of the divisions within the Court and
the separate concurring opinions.
C. The Ninth Amendment
Mr. Justice Goldberg's use of the ninth amendment is an interesting tour de force, but I fail to see how it adds in any substantial
way to the argument respecting the fundamental rights theory. For
years the Court followed the theory without finding it necessary to
fall back on the ninth amendment, which was certainly designed as
a limitation on the federal government. Perhaps the ninth amendment argument gives some satisfaction to Justices who have a sense
of uneasiness about going outside the Constitution in protecting
certain kinds of rights and helps to support further the illusion of
objectivity. Even if one were to concede that the use of the ninth
amendment negated the Black-Stewart hypothesis, however, it is
apparent that the basic problems in the use of the fundamental
rights theory still remain: what rights are fundamental and to what
limitations are they subject? One may conclude that the ninth
amendment adds a nice ornament to the argument, but that is about
all. On the other hand, the rejections by Justices Black and Stewart
of the ninth amendment argument are not very persuasive either.
Their point of emphasis is that the ninth and tenth amendments
were intended to make it clear that the federal government is one
of restricted powers. This may be conceded, yet the ninth amendment would still support the position taken by Mr. Justice Goldberg
that the first eight amendments were not deemed exhaustive of the
rights enjoyed by the people. The weakest part, however, of the
Black-Stewart argument based on the ninth amendment is that the
whole history of the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment has
been a story of the forging of new limitations on the states. Particularly .at the hands of Mr. Justice Black, it has been a process of making
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applicable to the states the specifics of the first eight amendments.
By equal force of reasoning, the ninth amendment should be incorporated into the fourteenth. If it is a "somersault of history" to use
the ninth amendment as a weapon of interpretation in order to
restrict a state's legislative power, it is certainly no greater somersault of history than that involved in finding that the states are subject to the establishment-o~-religion clause of the first amendment,
when it is clear that historically the principal purpose of that clause
was to prohibit Congress from interfering with state establishments.69

D. Mr. Justice Black's Thesis
In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Black reaffirmed and enlarged upon the basic view expressed in his dissent in Adamson that
the Court has no business invalidating state legislation that does not
violate the specifics of the Bill of Rights or other specifics found in
the Constitution. The whole fundamental rights theory is anathema
to him as an expression of judicial subjectivity and of natural rights
philosophy. Yet his proposed application to the states of all the
specifics of the Bill of Rights is in itself an extraordinary assertion
of judicial power, unsupported by the text or history of the fourteenth amendment.70 Moreover, Black's thesis runs into difficulties
when account is taken both of the ninth amendment, which according to his logic should also be made applicable to the states, and of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment, both of which furnish
means for invalidating governmental action on grounds other than
those stated in the specifics of the Bill of Rights. An even more basic
consideration, however, is that some of the so-called specifics of the
Bill of Rights are not so very specific; they admit of a very large
element of judicial subjectivity and discretion in their application, as
evidenced by Mr. Justice Douglas' use of peripheries, emanations,
and penumbras in his Griswold opinion. It happens that Mr. Justice
Black cannot subscribe to an expansive use of the specifics in this
particular case. Yet it will be recalled that it was Mr. Justice Black
who wrote the opinion of the Court in Brotherhood of Railway
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,71 in which the Court
protected, as an associational right under the first amendment, the
right of a railway union to assist the prosecution of claims by injured railroad workers through the giving of advice on their rights
69. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309 (1963) (dissenting opinion of
Stewart, J.).
70. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights1
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
.
'71. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
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and the channeling of legal employment to particular la'wyers. This
is certainly a more extensive and more distinctively marginal use of
the first amendment than the use of the specifics to protect the right
of privacy in the Griswold case. 72 To exclude the privacy of marital
association from protection under the Bill of Rights, while using the
first amendment as an umbrella for the kind of associational rig~t
protected in the Brotherhood case, appears to be a case of straining
at gnats while swallowing a camel. Moreover, as was suggested by
Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Griswold, the
breadth of the interpretation of the equal protection clause in
Reynolds v. Sims78 and of Article I in Wesberry v. Sanders, 74 whereby
the Court used those provisions as vehicles for invalidating legislative apportionment systems, is a much more audacious and far-reaching judicial interferenc~ with the state legislative process, sanctioned
neither by history nor by the specifics of the Constitution, than the
comparatively innocuous use of judicial power in Griswold to invalidate a law which was found on the statute books of a single state
and which in most respects was not being enforced. Compared with
the use. of judicial power in the apportionment cases, Griswold is but
a tempest in a teapot in its use of judicial power to invalidate a
statute impinging on the right of privacy. The equal protection
clause is as much an invitation to judicial formulation of policy as
the due process clause. In his dissent in Griswold, Mr. Justice Black
protested against the idea that it is the Court's duty to keep the Constitution in tune with the times and quoted with approval the late
Judge Learned Hand's statement that he would.find it most irksome
"to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians." 75 Mr. Justice Harlan
applauded these sentiments and suggested that the Court would
have been well advised to heed this advice when dealing with the
apportionment issue.
72. See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), where the Court made a
curious use of the "cruel and unusual punishment" limitation in invalidating a state
statute which, as construed, made it a crime to be a drug addict. This is another
instance where the Court, as an alternative to a straightforward application of the
familiar idea that the due process clause states an independent substantive limitation
on the arbitrary exercise of governmental power, achieved the same result by resorting
to a strained interpretation of a Dill of Rights specific in giving content to the due
process limitation. See the concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, and the follow•
ing language from Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion: "Finally, I deem this appli•
cation of 'cruel and unusual punishment' so novel that I suspect the Court was hard
put to find a way to ascribe to the Framers of the Constitution the result reached
today rather than to its own notions of ordered liberty. If this case involved economic
regulation, the present Court's allergy to substantive due process would surely save
the statute and prevent the Court from imposing its own philosophical predilections
upon state legislatures or Congress." 370 U.S. at 689.
73. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
74. 376 U.S. I (1964).
75. 381 U.S. at 526 (quoting from HAND, THE DILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958)).
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Justices Black and Stewart interpret the Court's recent decisions
as a repudiation of fundamental rights thinking. Thus Mr. Justice
Black referred to Griswold as a retreat from Ferguson v. Skrupa,76
in which he had said that the Court had long since discarded the idea
that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional
when th~y believe the legislature has acted unwisely. They view
recent cases finding legislation invalid under the due process clause
as meaning only that the Court uses this clause to enforce procedural
fairness, to condemn vague criminal legislation, and to invalidate
legislation that abridges the specifics of the Bill of Rights. 77 But
surely a case like Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 78 holding the denial
of passports to Communists invalid under the due process clause as
an over-broad restriction on the right to travel protected under the ·
due process clause, is an affirmation of the fundamental rights interpretation of due process. Mr. Justice Black asserted in Griswold
that if Aptheker "was written or intended to bring about the abrupt
and drastic reversal in the course of constitutional adjudication
which is now attributed to it, the change was certainly made in a
very quiet and unprovocative manner, without any attempt to justify
it." 79 But one may ask in turn whether all of the Justices who concurred in the Skrupa opinion understood that they were overruling
sub silentio earlier cases like Meyer and Pierce. As Griswold has
made clear, the notion of substantive due process shows a remarkable
vitality despite Mr. Justice Black's several efforts to lay it to rest and
to pronounce a fitting requiem.
As Justices Black and Stewart so well pointed out, there is always
the danger that the Court, in employing the fundamental rights
theory, will substitute its judgment for that of the legislature. in
determining what is wise economic or social policy. This risk, however, is inherent in the system of judicial review and occurs whenever the Court invalidates a legislative act, whether in the name of
due process or equal protection, in the name of the broad specifics of
the Bill of Rights, or in the name of the peripheral rights embraced
in the penumbra of the specifics, -and regardless of whether the Court
employs a technique of balancing interests or uses a standard of
reasonableness, or employs a more exacting judicial scrutiny as in
the instant case. The basic problem is not whether a court in exercising the power of judicial review may pass judgment on legislative
76. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
77. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 517 n.10 (dissenting opinion of Black,
J.); id. at 528, 530 n.7 (dissenting opinion of Stewart, J.). One very interesting aspect
of Griswold is the wide differences among the Justices in interpreting prior cases.
78. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
79. 381 U.S. at 517 n.10.
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acts, but rather how wisely it exercises this power in identifying,
appraising, and weighing the competing interests. The Court is
_always faced with the task of defining the right and determining the
standard to be employed in passing on the constitutionality of legislation impinging on the right. These are two distinctive aspects of the
judicial function in these cases. '.To refuse to recognize a right claimed
to be basic to our constitutional order for fear that the Court, in
exercising its power to protect that right, will employ a standard
whereby it usurps the legislative function in determining basic social
policy, obscures analysis of the Court's role and denies the Court's
resourcefulness in employing standards appropriate to the particular
case. Itis worth emphasizing here that the members of the Court who
found the Connecticut statute invalid as applied to invade the realm
of marital rights did not purport to pass judgment on the wisdom
or reasonableness of the general moral policy expressed in the legislation.
E. Conclusion

Griswold v. Connecticut is a reaffirmation of a power long exercised by the Court in protecting fundamental rights. It required no
judicial roving at large to reach the conclusion that the freedom of
the marital relationship is a part of the bundle of rights associated
with home, family, and marriage-rights supported by precedent,
history, and common understanding. For a court to find that these
rights are fundamental, whether because they are deeply written in
the tradition and conscience of our people, are part of the concept of
ordered liberty, are implicit in the notion of a free society, or emanate from the totality of the constitutional order, involves no immodest or startling exercise of judicial power. The decision operates
within a narrow sphere. In exercising its power in Griswold to protect a fundamental personal liberty, the Court, far from advancing to
a new milepost on the high road to judicial supremacy, was treading
a worn and familiar path.

